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3Introduction
The impact of the coronavirus offers definitive 
evidence of Europe’s vulnerability to global challenges 
and disorder. Its diffusion is the product of multiple 
governance failures at national and international 
levels. Geopolitical competition and nationalism have 
engulfed international affairs, undermining multilateral 
cooperation needed to manage interdependence.  
EU leaders should measure up to the 
challenge and set the Union on the course 
of not only economic but fully-fledged 
strategic recovery.
The pandemic risks amplifying these trends. Countries 
are tempted to retrench behind national walls. The 
ongoing competition of narratives concerning the 
virus compounds a broader competition of political 
and economic models. Under such conditions, the 
dysfunction of the global order may lead to irretrievable 
system failure, with dire consequences for all. 
The main lesson of this unprecedented health crisis 
for the EU is that there is no safety without unity. 
Europeans should not only craft a decisive response 
to the pandemic but also use it as a springboard to 
reinforce the EU, strengthening their domestic power 
base to carry more weight on the global stage. Given 
the nature of the current health emergency and the 
breadth of its implications, Europe will need a flexible 
approach to deal with uncertain developments. However, 
clear choices need to be made to set the direction of 
the path to recovery. The post-COVID-19 world will 
require the EU to be more strategic and, where needed, 
more autonomous, in order to defend its interests and 
enhance international cooperation. EU leaders should 
measure up to the challenge and set the Union on  
the course of not only economic but fully-fledged 
strategic recovery. 
1.  A vulnerable Union
The complex construction of the EU – consensus 
among member states required for major decisions 
and limited powers to take action in various fields (e.g. 
health, foreign policy) – is particularly exposed to the 
shockwaves of the pandemic. At the same time, there 
is no doubt that, as in previous crises, only the EU can 
offer the scale and clout for Europeans to cope with 
the effects of major transnational shocks. 
With every successive shock since the  
onset of the financial crisis over a  
decade ago, the EU’s political skin has 
become thinner. 
At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
Europe, member states failed to coordinate, and the 
EU’s performance has been disappointing. Important 
steps have since been taken to cope with the massive 
economic impact of the pandemic, chiefly the European 
Central Bank (ECB)’s bond-buying Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the loosening of 
spending constraints for eurozone members under the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Other measures to 
support health- and unemployment-related expenditure 
have been envisaged, and a temporary framework 
allowing member states full flexibility under state aid 
rules has been adopted. 
However, if the PEPP buys time to define a fully-fledged, 
shared response to the economic crisis, the steps taken 
so far fall short of paving the way to sustained recovery. 
In particular, the toxic debate on whether and how to 
mutualise risks to generate massive financial firepower, 
thereby enabling all countries to work their way out 
of a recession, has sharpened familiar divides among 
member states. With every successive shock since the 
onset of the financial crisis over a decade ago, the EU’s 
political skin has become thinner.
At first sight, this is a paradox. The more EU member 
states adopted policy remedies to contain (financial, 
economic, migration) crises, the more political rifts 
deepened within and between countries. The reason 
is twofold. For one, perceptions matter, and are easily 
exploited by Eurosceptic forces. Policy measures may 
help in practice but, if they are seen as the bitter 
outcome of agonising negotiations, they can feed mutual 
distrust. For another, firefighting is harder and more 
costly than forest management. European leaders 
have mostly delivered reactive measures to strengthen 
the resilience of their shared political, economic and 
security order instead of taking preventive ones. 
42.  Four lessons to build upon
The core message of the pandemic to Europe is that it is 
time to bolster its integration. A severe health risk set to 
last for months, a deep global recession hitting Europe 
particularly hard, a massive spike in unemployment, 
the disruption of trade and many industries, and the 
political impact of all these developments require a 
different level of ambition from Europe when it crafts a 
comprehensive response. 
Part of the problem with buttressing joint action lies 
in the constraints of national politics and particularly 
the pressure of nationalist forces on their respective 
governments. However, that is not the whole story. The 
spread of the virus in Europe also showed that national 
reflexes have become mainstream, with governments 
taking unilateral action and failing to frame the current 
crisis in larger, more strategic and European terms. The 
bigger picture has been lost.  
The decision on a strong economic 
recovery fund is not about finance but 
rather ‘grand strategy’. 
There is a consensus that this crisis will carry far-reaching 
implications for global affairs. Even though the long-
term impact of COVID-19 is hard to anticipate, many 
argue that it will accentuate great power competition, in 
particular between the US and China; accelerate power 
shifts; splinter globalisation; and aggravate the crisis of 
the international order.1 These trends may also further 
destabilise Europe’s fragile neighbourhood, worsening 
geopolitical standoffs and conflicts that already affect 
local populations and hurt the EU’s interests. 
In the face of systemic challenges, the debate in 
Europe is framed in the wrong way. The decision on a 
strong economic recovery fund is not about finance but 
rather ‘grand strategy’ – the mobilisation of all necessary 
domestic resources to achieve big, systemic goals, both 
at home and abroad. 
In this context, socioeconomic recovery is the fuel 
of political cohesion, which in turn is the engine of a 
stronger Europe in the world. A more powerful Europe 
is the only vehicle geared to protect EU citizens from 
manifold external challenges and project Europe’s 
interests on the global stage. Therefore, when taking 
big strategic decisions this spring, EU leaders should be 
mindful of four major lessons. These lessons predate 
the pandemic, but the spread of the coronavirus has 
underscored them.
1. Europe will not be safe in a world where power 
politics, nationalism and authoritarianism are 
gaining ground, disrupting cooperation and 
weaponising interdependence. 
2. Such detrimental conditions will prevail unless 
strong action is taken to not only counter the 
challenges to Europe and manage competition, but 
also bolster a stable, rule-based international order. 
3. While the EU and its member states cannot shape 
such an order on their own, they can join forces 
to defend their interests and make a decisive 
contribution to international cooperation, in 
partnership with others. 
4. The EU will lack the credibility and resources to do 
so if Europeans fight rear-guard battles between 
themselves instead of strengthening their cohesion, 
resilience and domestic power base. 
3.  Towards a more strategic and autonomous 
Europe
In the coming days and weeks, EU leaders and 
institutions must scale up their response to the 
pandemic. They should equip the Union with adequate 
and shared financial means to relaunch growth and 
reassert political cohesion among member states. They 
should also agree on a coordinated if differentiated 
strategy to phase out lockdowns, minimise the risks 
of renewed outbreaks and prevent more disjointed, 
unilateral action. A substantial package of economic and 
safety measures will strengthen Europeans’ ability to 
confront the broader strategic implications of the crisis 
and the many challenges that pre-existed and  
will outlive it.
A more competitive and unstable strategic context 
demands that Europeans learn to speak the language of 
power, as EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell put it. If a 
more robust posture is necessary to defend EU interests, 
however, it is not enough to define Europe as a political 
community nor power. The EU and its member states 
must prepare to cope with power politics without 
endorsing its logic.2 As Borrell also remarked, “How can 
5we prevent power politics from becoming the organising 
principle of international relations? The answer is clear, 
through multilateral rules.”3 
To affirm its interests and its commitment 
to rules-based cooperation, Europe  
should simultaneously brace for 
turbulence, empower joint action and 
engage on the international stage.
Charting its course between geopolitics and 
multilateralism, Europe should become more strategic 
and autonomous.4 Europe’s strategic autonomy 
is about setting objectives and mobilising the 
necessary resources in ways that do not primarily 
depend on the decisions and assets of others.5 The 
pandemic has provided more evidence that Europe 
needs to become more self-reliant. Strategic autonomy, 
however, is not an escape to isolationism but a stronger 
platform for cooperation, whenever possible. Neither 
is it about achieving elusive independence in an 
interconnected world, but rather a further degree of 
control over Europe’s choices and future. Finally, it is 
not an alternative to key partnerships, in particular 
the strategic one with the US that remains critical to 
Europe’s security and prosperity, but a condition  
for the EU to be a more effective partner, based on  
a sustained dialogue over respective interests  
and priorities. 
The pandemic makes progressing towards strategic 
autonomy both necessary and harder. The crisis will 
shrink financial resources, severely stress social bonds 
and make Europe’s politics more volatile, potentially 
leaving EU countries more exposed to foreign influence. 
Besides, the risk of renewed health emergencies cannot 
be excluded until a vaccine is available. This is precisely 
the reason why a business-as-usual approach would take 
the Union down the path of decline and fragmentation, 
and a step change is indispensable.
Of course, even an ambitious response to COVID-
19 would not erase all the differences and gridlocks 
between member states overnight. However, it would 
send a powerful signal of renewed self-confidence, 
which could trickle down and inform decisions across a 
variety of fields. Progressing towards strategic autonomy 
requires an approach that encompasses economic, 
technological and security dimensions, as contemporary 
global competition applies to multiple domains at once. 
To affirm its interests and its commitment to rules-
based cooperation, Europe should simultaneously brace 
for turbulence, empower joint action and engage on the 
international stage.
3.1   BRACE
Bracing means strengthening Europe’s cohesion 
and resilience to multidimensional competition, 
transnational crises and deliberate attacks. 
Completing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and better enforcing the rules of the Single Market 
is essential to shield member states against global 
economic volatility and shocks. The EU should also 
step up its trade defence instruments and shared 
arrangements to screen foreign investment in critical 
sectors, to cope with geo-economic competition.  
The activation of any solidarity mechanism 
requires a quick and truly European 
political reflex. 
The pandemic has exposed various shortcomings in 
Europe’s internal crisis management mechanisms.  
On 26 March, the European Council tasked the 
Commission with “[putting] into place a more ambitious 
and wide-ranging crisis management system within 
the EU.”6 Just like the current pandemic, future 
transnational crises, be they natural or man-made, can 
quickly spill over from one policy sector to another. 
There is, therefore, a need to both review distinct  
policy arrangements and ensure their better integration, 
not least with a view to effectively implement the 
so-called Solidarity Clause foreseen in the EU Treaty. 
Above all, the activation of any solidarity mechanism 
requires a quick and truly European political reflex.
Civil protection mechanisms and the protection of 
critical infrastructure are areas of primary focus.  
Distinct approaches should be tailored to different 
sectors. However, cross-cutting questions concern 
preparedness; the review and upgrading of national 
capabilities; the exchange of information among 
member states; early warnings; and the capacity to 
quickly back up national capabilities through joint 
assets, when necessary.7 Among other challenges, 
since digital technologies enable the functioning of all 
other critical infrastructures, advancing cybersecurity 
is a top priority and will require tighter coordination 
among national authorities and stronger arrangements 
at the EU level. At the same time, Europeans need to 
invest more in countering disinformation, which will 
entail increasing dedicated institutional resources 
and leveraging Europe’s rich civil society, business 
and media networks through bottom-up initiatives. 
The EU should also take a more proactive approach to 
strengthen the resilience of its neighbours – beyond  
the fact that transnational crises ignore borders, this 
would also reinforce rules-based partnerships with  
these countries.
63.2   EMPOWER
Empowering Europe means leveraging the untapped 
potential of the EU and its member states’ joint 
action to carry their full weight on the global stage. 
Reinforcing the EMU is the starting point to expanding 
the role of the euro – a crucial component of Europe’s 
global influence – in the international financial system. 
The EU must complete the Single Market (particularly 
for services, digital and capital markets), to not only 
withstand competition but also unleash opportunities 
for European companies and consolidate Europe’s 
regulatory power.8 Against the bedrock of the Single 
Market, the EU should foster ongoing efforts to achieve  
a rules-based level playing field with economic  
partners and competitors. This includes addressing 
concerns around foreign subsidies and market access i 
n third countries.
The digital and industrial strategies adopted by the 
Commission in, respectively, February and March 2020 
(alongside a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and a 
European strategy on data) point to several milestones 
to strengthen, as these documents put it, Europe’s 
strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty or 
sovereignty tout court.9 Among these priorities, the EU 
and its member states must create the conditions for 
a thriving European data economy and AI applications 
that advance competitiveness while respecting citizens’ 
rights. Europeans should boost joint investment 
in research in strategic areas, including future and 
emerging technologies and disruptive innovation. 
Europe should also create a more favourable funding 
and regulatory environment for ambitious high-tech 
start-ups – an area where it seriously lags the US  
and Asia.
Europeans cannot afford to have the economic impact 
of the crisis weaken their security by crippling defence 
investment. While cuts in defence budgets can be 
expected, cooperation will be all the more essential 
to maximise joint output.10 Defence cooperation 
at the EU level is at an early stage but can make a 
significant difference to the enhancement of operational 
capabilities, as long as member states clearly define 
their level of ambition and invest in large scale, joint 
projects that fill clear capability gaps. Maintaining 
a sizeable European Defence Fund under the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will be critical 
to support this cooperation. Europeans will also need 
to deliver a much stronger crisis management capacity 
to stabilise a turbulent neighbourhood before crises get 
out of hand and foreign powers fill geopolitical voids. 
This is about Europeans becoming more viable security 
providers alongside partners, such as through NATO and 
the UN, or on their own, if necessary.
3.3   ENGAGE
A stronger Europe should also be a staunch 
advocate for engagement to uphold rules-based 
cooperation and reforming the international order. 
Multilateralism is not just a set of procedures but a 
mindset; it is about elevating the power of the rules over 
the rule of power. In a contested strategic landscape, 
where major powers take a utilitarian and selective 
approach to international cooperation, multilateral 
solutions are often out of reach. Nevertheless, the EU 
should continue to pursue them while taking a flexible, 
pragmatic approach to cooperation that operates at 
multiple levels simultaneously.
This applies, for example, to trade matters. The EU 
should continue to invest in the reform of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and comply with its rules. 
At the same time, it should also work with variable 
coalitions in those areas where WTO rules are currently 
lacking, find temporary solutions to the gridlock of the 
WTO dispute settlement regime, and pursue ambitious 
trade deals. Most recently, the EU has outlined a 
multilevel, ‘Team Europe’ global response to COVID-
19, working through bilateral, regional and multilateral 
channels to provide emergency response, strengthen 
health systems and deal with the socioeconomic 
consequences of the pandemic.11 This approach  
should be taken forward and necessary resources  
made available.  
Establishing multilateral norms, working 
through like-minded coalitions and 
managing differences will coexist in 
the EU’s approach to international 
engagement. 
In coming years, a particular effort will be required 
to expand global governance arrangements to cover 
fast-evolving technologies (e.g. digital, nano- and 
biotechnologies) and their extensive applications. This 
should be done in parallel with proactive engagement 
with partners in global standard-setting, while also 
strengthening Europe’s science diplomacy. The 
Commission has announced that it will roll out a  
Global Digital Cooperation Strategy by 2021. This is 
about combining policy developments at the EU  
level with a strong commitment to global dialogue  
and cooperation. 
Of course, in this field as well as others, this will be 
a very difficult exercise, fraught with trade-offs and 
uneven results. This is, however, the new normal of 
international cooperation. Establishing multilateral 
norms, working through like-minded coalitions and 
managing differences will coexist in the EU’s approach 
to international engagement. 
7Conclusion
The EU and its member states’ response to the  
COVID-19 crisis will say a lot about them, and their 
future. If EU leaders measure what is at stake, and 
measure up to the challenge, they can create new 
momentum for European integration. Progress will 
require sustained political focus and flexibility over 
time, but this is the moment to send a definite political 
signal of European unity, matching words with deeds. 
Upcoming decisions on a financial recovery package 
for Europe should be seen not as a point of arrival, but 
one of departure. That should become the bedrock of a 
more strategic and autonomous Europe, determined to 
not just overcome the pandemic but close ranks in the 
face of various other challenges. If, however, EU leaders 
fail, the ensuing political crisis will take Europe down 
the alternative road of progressive fragmentation and 
strategic dependence.  
Upcoming decisions on a financial recovery 
package for Europe should be seen not as a 
point of arrival, but one of departure.
Ultimately, this is a matter of credibility vis-à-vis both 
EU citizens and international partners. For Europe, 
credibility requires consistency and capacity. 
Consistency means, first and foremost, showing that 
sharing sovereignty and pooling resources work. When 
discussing a recovery fund, the Union’s MFF, the 
Green Deal, the European approach to digital matters, 
eurozone reform or the reform of Europe’s asylum and 
migration policy, Europe’s credibility is on the line. 
Europe’s influence in its neighbourhood and beyond 
ultimately rests on its economic success, political 
values, a fair society, environmental sustainability and 
multilateral engagement. However, these core assets 
need defending. Consistency and capacity cannot be 
delinked. Any positive agenda needs to be backed by 
adequate means to confront competition, implement 
Europe’s choices and advance international cooperation.
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